This paper presents two key-recovery attacks against Achterbahn-128/80, the last version of one of the stream cipher proposals in the eSTREAM project. The attack against the 80-bit variant, Achterbahn-80, has complexity 2 56.32 . The attack against Achterbahn-128 requires 2 75.4 operations and 2 61 keystream bits. These attacks are based on an improvement of the attack due to Hell and Johansson against Achterbahn version 2 and also on an algorithm that makes prot of the short lengths of the constituent registers.
Introduction
Achterbahn [4, 6] is a stream cipher proposal submitted to the eSTREAM project. After the cryptanalysis of the rst two versions [9, 8] , it has moved on to a new one called Achterbahn-128/80 [5] published in June 2006. Achterbahn-128/80 corresponds to two keystream generators with key sizes of 128 bits and 80 bits, respectively. Their maximal keystream length is limited to 2 63 . We present here two attacks against both generators. The attack against the 80 bit variant, Achterbahn-80, has complexity 2 56.32 . The attack against * This work was supported in part by the European Commission through the IST Programme under Contract IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT. The information in this document reects only the author's views, is provided as is and no warranty is given that the information is t for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability.
Achterbahn-128 requires 2 75.4 operations and 2 61 keystream bits. These attacks are based on an improvement of the attack against Achterbahn version 2 and also on an algorithm that makes prot of the short lengths of the constituent registers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main specications of Achterbahn-128/80. Section 3 then describes the general principle of the attack proposed by Hell and Johansson [8] against the previous version of the cipher Achterbahn v2, since our attacks rely on a similar technique. We also exhibit a new attack against Achterbahn v2 with complexity 2 49.8 , while the best previously known attack had complexity 2 59 . Section 4 then presents two attacks against Achterbahn-80 and Achterbahn-128 respectively. Section 5 describes how to recover the key.
Main specications of Achterbahn-128
Achterbahn-128 is a keystream generator, consisting of 13 binary nonlinear feedback shift registers (NLFSRs). The length of register i is L i = 21 + i for i = 0, 1, . . . , 12. These NLFSRs are primitive in the sense that their periods T i are equal to 2 L i −1. The sequence which is used as an input to the Boolean combining function is not the output sequence of the NLFSR directly, but a shifted version of itself. The shift amount depends on the register number, but it is xed for each register. In the following, x i = (x i (t)) t≥0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 12 denotes the shifted version of the output of the register i at time t.
The output of the keystream generator at time t, denoted by S(t), is the one of the Boolean combining function F with the inputs corresponding to the output sequences of the NLFSRs correctly shifted, i.e. S(t) = F (x 0 (t), . . . , x 12 (t)). The Boolean combining function F is given by: 6 x 10 + x 6 x 11 + x 6 x 12 + x 7 x 8 + x 7 x 12 + x 8 x 9 + x 8 x 10 + x 9 x 10 + x 9 x 11 + x 9 x 12 + x 10 x 12 + x 0 x 5 x 8 + x 0 x 5 x 10 + x 0 x 5 x 11 +x 0 x 5 x 12 +x 1 x 2 x 8 +x 1 x 2 x 12 +x 1 x 4 x 10 +x 1 x 4 x 11 +x 1 x 8 x 9 +x 1 x 9 x 10 + x 1 x 9 x 11 +x 1 x 9 x 12 +x 2 x 3 x 8 +x 2 x 3 x 12 +x 2 x 4 x 8 +x 2 x 4 x 10 +x 2 x 4 x 11 +x 2 x 4 x 12 + x 2 x 7 x 8 +x 2 x 7 x 12 +x 2 x 8 x 10 +x 2 x 8 x 11 +x 2 x 9 x 10 +x 2 x 9 x 11 +x 2 x 10 x 12 +x 2 x 11 x 12 + x 3 x 4 x 8 + x 3 x 4 x 12 + x 3 x 8 x 9 + x 3 x 9 x 12 + x 4 x 7 x 8 + x 4 x 7 x 12 + x 4 x 8 x 9 + x 4 x 9 x 12 + x 5 x 6 x 8 +x 5 x 6 x 10 +x 5 x 6 x 11 +x 5 x 6 x 12 +x 6 x 8 x 10 +x 6 x 8 x 11 +x 6 x 10 x 12 +x 6 x 11 x 12 + x 7 x 8 x 9 + x 7 x 9 x 12 + x 8 x 9 x 10 + x 8 x 9 x 11 + x 9 x 10 x 12 + x 9 x 11 x 12 + x 0 x 5 x 8 x 10 + x 0 x 5 x 8 x 11 + x 0 x 5 x 10 x 12 + x 0 x 5 x 11 4 x 10 x 12 + x 2 x 4 x 11 x 12 + x 2 x 5 x 7 x 8 + x 2 x 5 x 7 x 12 + x 2 x 8 x 9 x 10 + x 2 x 8 x 9 x 11 + x 2 x 9 x 10 x 12 + x 2 x 9 x 11 x 12 + x 3 x 4 x 8 x 9 + x 3 x 4 x 9 x 12 + x 4 x 7 x 8 x 9 + x 4 x 7 x 9 x 12 + x 5 x 6 x 8 x 10 + x 5 x 6 x 8 x 11 + x 5 x 6 x 10 x 12 + x 5 x 6 x 11 x 12 .
Its main cryptographic properties are :
• balancedness
• algebraic degree = 4
• correlation immunity order = 8
• nonlinearity = 3584
• algebraic immunity = 4
Main specications of Achterbahn-80
Achterbahn-80 consists of 11 registers, which are the same ones as in the above case, except for the rst and the last ones. The Boolean combining function, G, is a sub-function of F :
Its main cryptographic properties are :
• correlation immunity order = 6
• nonlinearity = 896
As we can see, Achterbahn-128 contains Achterbahn-80 as a substructure.
The key-loading algorithm
The key-loading algorithm uses the key K and an initial value IV . The method for initializing the registers is the following one: rst of all, all registers are lled with the bits of K||IV . After that, register i is clocked a − L i times where a is the number of bits of K||IV , and the remaining bits of K||IV are added to the feedback bit. Then, each register outputs one bit. Those bits are taken as input on the Boolean combining function, which outputs a new bit. This bit is now added to the feedbacks for 32 additional clockings. Then we overwrite the last cell of each register with a 1, in order to avoid the all zero state.
This algorithm has been modied in relation to the previous versions. The aim of this modication is to prevent the attacker from recovering the key K from the knowledge of the initial states of some registers.
3 Attack against Achterbahn version 2 with complexity of 2 49.8
Principle of Hell and Johansson attack against Achterbahn v2
Achterbahn version 2 was the previous version of Achterbahn. The main and most important dierences to this last one, which are used by the attack are that:
• it had 10 registers, with lengths between 19 and 32 bits,
• the Boolean function, f , had correlation immunity order 5.
This version has been broken by Johansson and Hell [8] . Their attack is a distinguishing attack that relies on the following well-known lemma, which is a particular case of [1, Th. 6].
Lemma 1 Let X be a random variable that takes its values into F 2 with a distribution D close to the uniform distribution that is
Then, for a number of samples
where d is a real number, the error probability of the optimal distinguisher is approximately
, where Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution:
In the following, we will consider d = 1 which corresponds to an error probability of about 0.3. The previous quantity ε that measures the distance between D and the uniform distribution is called the bias of D.
The attack proposed by Hell and Johansson exploits a quadratic approximation q of the combining function f :
with m quadratic terms and which satises
We build the parity-check equations, as the ones introduced by [9] , that make disappear the quadratic terms by summing up:
at 2 m dierent moments (t + τ ) moments, where τ varies in the set of the linear combinations with 0 − 1 coecients of
This leads to
We then decimate the sequence (pc(t)) t≥0 by the periods of p sequences among (x i 1 (t)) t≥0 , . . . , (x is (t)) t≥0 . We can suppose here without loss of generality that the periods of the rst p sequences have been chosen. Now a new parity-check, pc p , can be dened by:
This way, the inuence of those p registers on the parity-check pc p (t) corresponds to the addition of a constant for all t ≥ 0, so it will be 0 or 1 for all the parity-checks. Now, the attack consists in performing an exhaustive search for the initial states of the (s − p) remaining registers, i.e. those of indices i p+1 , . . . , i s . For each possible values for these initial states, we compute:
Using this bias, we can distinguish the keystream (S(t)) t≥0 from a random sequence and also recover the initial states of (s − p) constituent registers.
Complexity
• We will have 2 m terms in each parity-check. That means that we need to compute ε −2 m+1 = 2 n b 2 m+1 values of σ(t) for mounting the distinguishing attack, where n b = log 2 ε −1 . Besides, σ(t) is dened by (1), implying that the attack requires
where L i j are the lengths of the registers associated to the periods by which we have decimated, and the last term corresponds to the maximal distance between the bits involved in each parity-check.
• Time complexity will be
where i p+1 , . . . , i s are the indices of the registers by which period we have not decimated, so the registers over whom we have made an exhaustive search and whose initial state we are going to nd.
Example with Achterbahn version 2
Hell and Johansson [8] have used this attack against Achterbahn version 2 with the following quadratic approximation:
Then, they decimate by the period of the second register, whose length is 22. After that, they make an exhaustive search over the rst register, whose length is 19. Time complexity will be 2 62 and data complexity 2 59.02 . Using the small lengths of the registers, time complexity can be reduced below data complexity, so the nal complexity of the attack will be 2 59.02 .
Improvement of the Attack against Achterbahn version 2
We are going to improve the previously described attack against Achterbahn v2 and we reduce the complexity to 2 49.8 . For this attack, we use the idea of associating the variables in order to reduce the number of terms that we will have in the parity-checks. The only eect that this could have on the nal complexity of the attack is to enlarge the number of required keystream bits; but being careful, we make it stay the same while reducing the time complexity.
The chosen approximation. At rst, we searched between all the quadratics approximations of f with one and two quadratic terms, as the original attack presented by Hell and Johansson was based on a quadratic approximation. Finally, after looking after a trade-o between the number of terms, the number of variables, the bias... we found that none quadratic approximation was better for this attack than linear ones. It is worth noticing that, since the combining function f is 5-resilient, any approximation of f involves at least 6 input variables. Moreover, the highest bias corresponding to an approximation of f by a 6-variable function is achieved by a function of degree one as proved in [3] . After analyzing all linear approximations of the Boolean combining function, we found that the best one was:
We have f (x 1 , . . . , x 10 ) = g(x 1 , . . . , x 10 ) with a probability of 1 2 (1 + 2
−3
).
Parity-checks. Let us build a parity-check as follows:
The terms x 8 , x 6 , x 2 , x 1 will disappear and, so, ggg(t) is a sequence that depends uniquely on the sequences x 3 and x 4 . Adding four times the approximation has the eect of multiplying the bias four times, so the bias of
is 2
−3×4
= 2 −12 because 4 is the number of terms in ggg(t). That means that we will need 2
3×4×2

= 2
24 values of the parity-check for detecting this bias. If we decimate ggg(t) by the period of register 3, we will need
49.8 bits of keystream, and time complexity will be
as we only guess the initial state of register 4. We consider that the total complexity is given by the data complexity, as it is higher than the time complexity. This complexity is 2 49.8 while the complexity of the previous attack was equal to 2 59 .
Cryptanalysis of Achterbahn-128/80
Now, we describe a new attack against Achterbahn-80 with a complexity of 2 56.32 where a linear approximation of the output function is considered. The attack is a distinguishing attack but it also allows to recover the initial states of certain constituent registers. We also describe an attack against Achterbahn-128 with a complexity of 2 75.4 where we consider a linear approximation of the output function and we make prot of the short lengths of the registers involved in the proposed stream cipher.
Cryptanalysis of Achterbahn-80
This attack is very similar to the improvement of the attack against Achterbahn version 2 which has been described in the previous section.
Our attack exploits the following linear approximation of the combining function G:
Since G is 6-resilient, is the best approximation by a 7-variable function.
For (t) = x 1 (t)+x 3 (t)+x 4 (t)+x 5 (t)+x 6 (t)+x 7 (t)+x 10 (t), the keystream (S(t)) t≥0 satises Pr[S(t) = (t)] = Parity-checks. Let us build a parity-check as follows:
The terms containing the sequences x 4 , x 5 , x 6 , x 7 vanish in (t), so (t) depends exclusively on the sequences x 1 , x 3 and x 10 .
Adding four times the approximation has the eect of multiplying the bias four times, so the bias of
σ(t) = S(t) + S(t + T 7 T 4 ) + S(t + T
where (S(t)) t≥0 is the keystream, is 2 −4×3 . This means that we need 2 3×4×2 = 2 24 parity-checks σ(t) to detect this bias. We now decimate σ(t) by the period of the register 10, which is involved in the parity-check, so we create like this a new parity-check: 
Cryptanalysis of Achterbahn-128
Now, we present a distinguishing attack against the 128-bit version of Achterbahn which also recovers the initial states of two registers.
We consider the following approximation of the combining function F :
Then, for (t) = x 0 (t)+x 3 (t)+x 7 (t)+x 4 (t)+x 10 (t)+x 8 (t)+x 9 (t)+x 1 (t)+x 2 (t), we have Pr[S(t) = (t)] = 1 2
(1 + 2
−3
Parity-checks. The period of any sequence obtained by combining the registers 0, 3 and 7 is equal to lcm(T 0 , T 3 , T 7 ), i.e. 2 59.3 as T 0 T 3 and T 7 have common divisors. We are going to denote this value by T 0,3,7 .
If we build a parity check as follows:
(t + τ ), the terms containing the sequences x 0 , x 3 , x 7 , x 4 , x 10 , x 8 , x 9 will disappear from (t), so (t) depends exclusively on the sequences x 1 and x 2 :
where σ 1 (t) and σ 2 (t) are the parity-checks calculated on the sequences generated by NLFSRs 1 and 2. Adding eight times the approximation has the eect of multiplying the bias eight times, so the bias of
where (S(t)) t≥0 is the keystream, is 2 −8×3 . So:
This means that we need 2
3×8×2
= 2 48 values of σ(t) + σ 1 (t) + σ 2 (t) to detect this bias.
We now describe an algorithm for computing the sum σ(t) + σ 1 (t) + σ 2 (t) over all values of t. This algorithm has a lower complexity than an exhaustive search for the initial states of the registers 1 and 2 simultaneously. Here we use (2
We can write it down as follows:
,
At this point, we can obtain σ(t) from the keystream and we can make an exhaustive search for the initial state of register 1. More precisely:
• We choose an initial state for register 2, e.g. the all one initial state.
We compute and save a binary vector V 2 of length T 2 :
where the sequence x 2 is generated from the choosen initial state. The complexity of this state is T 2 × 2 3 operations.
• For each possible initial state of register 1:
we compute and save a vector V 1 composed of T 2 integers of 26 bits.
The complexity of this state is: For each possible i from 0 to T 2 − 1: * we dene V 2 of length T 2 :
Actually, (V 2 [k]) k<T 2 corresponds to (σ 2 (k)) k<T 2 when the initial state of register 2 corresponds to internal state after clocking R2 i times from the all one initial state. * With the two vectors that we have obtained, we compute:
When we do this with the correct initial states of registers 1 and 2, we will nd the expected bias.
for each possible initial state of R1 do for k = 0 to T 2 − 1 do
end for
if we nd the bias then return the initial states of R1 and R2 end if end for end for Table 1 : Algorithm for nding the initial states of registers 1 and 2
The total time complexity of the attack is going to be:
, where 2 × T 2 × 2 4.7 is the time it takes to compute the sum described by (2) . Actually, we can speed up the process by rewriting the sum (2) in the following way
The issue is now to nd the i that maximizes this sum, this is the same as computing the maximum of the crosscorrelation of two sequences of length T 2 . We can do that eciently using a fast Fourier transform as explained in [2, pages 306-312]. The nal complexity will be in O(T 2 log T 2 ). Anyway, this does not change our total complexity as the higher term is the rst one. The complexity is going to be, nally:
.
The length of keystream needed is:
T 0,3,7 + T 4,10 + T 8,9 + 2
48
< 2 61 bits.
Recovering the key
As explained by Hell and Johansson in [7] , if we recover the initial states of all the registers, we will be able to retrieve the key as all the initialization steps which do not involve the key become invertible. It is easy to show that once we have found the initial states of two registers, the complexity of nding the remaining ones will be lower (for the other registers appearing in the used approximation it is quite evident: we apply the same method but simplied, as now we know two variables. For the other registers we can use the same method but with other linear approximations making prot of the already-known variables). Once we have found the initial states of all the registers, we can invert all the initializing steps until the end of the second step, which corresponds to the introduction of the key bits. At this point, there are two methods proposed in [7] . The rst one is clocking backwards register i |k| − L i times for each i. We do this for all the possibles values of the last |k| − L m key bits, where L m is 21 for Achterbahn-128 and 22 for Achterbahn-80. When all the registers have the same rst L m bits, we have found the correct |k| − L m bits of the key. The second method proposed is a meet-in-the-middle attack with time-memory tradeo as explained in [9] . It leads to a complexity of:
• For Achterbahn-80: 2 58 in time or 2 40 in memory and 2 40 in time.
• For Achterbahn-128: 2 107 in time or 2 40 in memory and 2 88 in time.
We can do better. We are going to make the example for Achterbahn-128. The idea is that we do not need to invert all the clocking steps in the meetin-the-middle attack, if we split the key into 2 parts composed of the rst 40 bits and the last 88 bits, we could make an exhaustive search for the rst part and store in a table the states of the registers obtained after applying the initialisation process for each set of 40 bits. Then, if we make an exhaustive search through the 88 remaining key bits, and we clock backwards the registers from the known states, we will nd a match in the 
